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What was Ía∫kara’s ßåstrårambha?* 
(published in: Íåstrårambha. Inquiries into the Preamble in Sanskrit. Ed. Walter Slaje. 
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. 2008. (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 62.) Pp. 
121-130) 
 
Ía∫kara, in his BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya, refers a few times to the beginning of his Íåstra, using 
the expressions ßåstrårambha and ßåstrapramukha. There has been controversy about the 
meaning of these expressions. This controversy concerns the question, “Which was the 
beginning of Ía∫kara’s Íåstra?” But another question looms behind it, viz., “Which was 
Ía∫kara’s Íåstra?” 
 Recall that Ía∫kara presents his philosophy as a form of M¥måµså. He calls it 
Vedåntam¥måµså (never Uttaram¥måµså). Ía∫kara was, of course, acquainted with the other 
kind of M¥måµså, i.e. ritual M¥måµså, which is sometimes called PËrvam¥måµså (though not 
by Ía∫kara). This raises the question whether he looked upon the two M¥måµsås as being 
together one Íåstra or two. Ía∫kara’s position on this issue is not immediately clear from his 
writings. Scholars have therefore tried to draw conclusions from the few passages that refer to 
the beginning of his Íåstra. If Ía∫kara, when using the expression “beginning of the Íåstra”, 
turns out to refer to texts of ritual M¥måµså, the conclusion will be justified that the two 
M¥måµsås together, in Ía∫kara’s opinion, were but one Íåstra. 
 Ía∫kara uses the expression ßåstrapramukha in the following passage, which is part of 
his comments on BrahmasËtra 3.3. 53 (eka åtmana˙ ßar¥re bhåvåt):  
 
nanu ßåstrapramukha eva prathame påde ßåstraphalopabhogayogyasya 
dehavyatiriktasyåtmano 'stitvam uktam/ satyam uktaµ bhå∑yak®tå/ na tu tatråtmåstitve 
sËtram asti/ iha tu svayam eva sËtrak®tå tadastitvam åk∑epapura˙saraµ prati∑†håpitam/ 
ita eva cåk®∑yåcåryeˆa ßabarasvåminå [122] pramåˆalak∑aˆe varˆitam/ ata eva ca 
bhagavatopavar∑eˆa prathame tantre åtmåstitvåbhidhånaprasaktau ßår¥rake vak∑yåma 
ity uddhåra˙ k®ta˙/ 
[Objection:] Has the existence of a self that is different from the body and capable of 
enjoying the fruit of the Íåstra not [already] been stated at the very beginning of the 
Íåstra, in the first Påda? 
[Answer:] That is true; it has been stated by the author of the Bhå∑ya. But there (i.e., at 
                         
* This article is essentially an extract of the portions dealing with ßåstrårambha and 
ßåstrapramukha in a longer article, “Vedånta as M¥måµså” (2006), published in a volume of 
the proceedings of the 12th World Sanskrit Conference, Helsinki 2003. 
1 BSËBhå on sËtra 3.3.53 (ed. J. L. Shastri p. 764 l. 9 - p. 765 l. 1); cp. Parpola, 1981: 153. 
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the beginning of the Íåstra) there is no sËtra about the existence of a self. Here (i.e., in 
BrahmasËtra 3.3.53), on the other hand, the existence of the [self] has been 
established, after an initial objection, by the author of the SËtra himself. And having 
taken it from here itself, Ócårya Íabarasvåmin has described [the existence of the self] 
in [the section] dealing with the means of valid cognition. Therefore also the revered 
Upavar∑a in the first Tantra, when he had to discuss the existence of the self, contented 
himself with saying: ‘We shall explain this in the Íår¥raka’. 
 
Hermann Jacobi (1911: 18 [576]) concluded from this passage that that “at Íabarasvåmin's 
time the PËrva and Uttara M¥måµså still formed one philosophical system, while after 
Kumårila and Ía∫kara they were practically two mutually exclusive philosophies”. Is this 
conclusion justified? It depends on the precise meaning of several terms used in this passage. 
What, to begin with, is meant by the expression "at the very beginning of the Íåstra, in the 
first Påda" (ßåstrapramukha eva prathame påde). Is it the same as "in the first Tantra" 
(prathame tantre), later on in the passage? Since "the first Tantra" is explicitly contrasted with 
and therefore differentiated from "the Íår¥raka" — the Íår¥raka being no doubt Upavar∑a's 
planned (or executed) commentary on the BrahmasËtra —, it seems safe to conclude that "the 
first Tantra" is the M¥måµsåsËtra (or Upavar∑a's commentary on it).2 Many interpreters 
identify “the very beginning of the Íåstra” with [123] M¥måµsåsËtra 1.1.5.3 But is this 
correct? Why should our short passage refer to one and the same discussion in three different 
ways: (i) “at the very beginning of the Íåstra, in the first Påda”, (ii) “in [the section] dealing 
with the means of valid cognition” and (iii) “in the first Tantra”?  
 We have to find out what Ía∫kara meant by "the beginning of the Íåstra". Related to 
this is the question whether Ía∫kara looked upon M¥måµsåsËtra and BrahmasËtra as together 
constituting one Íåstra, or as two different Íåstras. Jacobi, followed by Parpola (1981), 
invoke this passage to prove that the two together were originally one Íåstra, but their proof 
may be, at least in part, circular: The two disciplines were originally one because Ía∫kara 
refers to the M¥måµsåsËtra as "the beginning of the Íåstra", and "the beginning of the Íåstra" 
must refer to the M¥måµsåsËtra because the two disciplines were originally one. How do we 
get out of this circular argument? 
 There is another passage in Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya which may throw light on 
his understanding of his own Íåstra. It occurs under sËtra 1.1.4 and contains the expression 
ßåstrårambha:4 
                         
2 Cf. Kane, HistDh 5(2), p. 1160: “Ía∫karåcårya refers to the extant PËrvam¥måµså as 
Dvådaßalak∑aˆ¥ in his bhå∑ya on VedåntasËtra III.3.26, as ‘Prathamatantra’ in bhå∑ya on V.S. 
III.3.25, III.3.53 and III.4.27, as Prathama-kåˆ∂a in bhå∑ya on V.S. III.3.1, III.3.33, III.3.44, 
III.3.50, as Pramåˆalak∑aˆa in bhå∑ya on V.S. [2.1.1 and] III.4.42.” Similarly Kane, 1960: 
120. 
3 E.g. Deussen, 1887: 624; Thibaut, 1890/1896: II: 268; Gambhirananda, 1972: 740; 
Hiriyanna, 1925: 231; Kane, 1960: 120; Kane, HistDh 5(2), p. 1160; Parpola, 1981: 153; 
Ramachandrudu, 1989: 234-235; Bouy, 2000: 23 n. 92; Govindånanda and Ónandagiri on 
BrahmasËtra 3.3.53. 
4 BSËBhå on sËtra 1.1.4 (ed. J.L. Shastri p. 98 l. 3-7). 
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evaµ ca sati “athåto brahmajijñåså” iti tadvi∑aya˙ p®thakßåstrårambha upapadyate/ 
pratipattividhiparatve hi “athåto dharmajijñåså” ity evårabdhatvån na p®thakßåstram 
årabhyeta/ årabhyamåˆaµ caivam årabhyate: “athåta˙ parißi∑†adharmajijñåså” iti, 
“athåta˙ kratvarthapuru∑årthayor jijñåså” itivat/ brahmåtmaikyåvagatis tv apratijñåteti 
tadartho yukta˙ ßåstrårambha˙ “athåto brahmajijñåså” iti/ 
Such being the case, it is proper to begin a separate Íåstra with the words “Then 
therefore the enquiry into Brahma” (BrahmasËtra 1.1.1) because it deals with that. For 
in case [this Íåstra] were to deal with injunctions that one has to know [Brahma], no 
separate Íåstra could be begun, because [the Íåstra of injunctions (viz. the 
M¥måµsåsËtra)] has already begun with the words “Then therefore the enquiry into 
Dharma” (M¥måµsåsËtra 1.1.1). Something that has already begun would begin like 
this “Then therefore the enquiry into the remaining Dharma”, just like “Then therefore 
the enquiry into the purpose of the sacrifice and into the purpose [124] of man” (which 
is a sËtra (4.1.1) that introduces a chapter of the M¥måµsåsËtra). But because 
knowledge of the identity of Brahma and åtman has not been stated (in the M¥måµså), 
the beginning of a [new] Íåstra in the form “Then therefore the enquiry into Brahma” 
in order to convey that [knowledge] is appropriate. 
 
As the translation shows, this passage lends itself easily to an interpretation in which the 
BrahmasËtra belongs to a separate Íåstra (p®thakßåstra), different from ritual M¥måµså. 
 There is more. According to Ía∫kara in his comments on BrahmasËtra 3.3.53 which 
we studied above, “the existence of a self that is different from the body and capable of 
enjoying the fruit of the Íåstra has [already] been stated at the very beginning of the Íåstra, in 
the first Påda”. The very first Påda of Íabara's Bhå∑ya on the M¥måµsåsËtra does indeed 
contain a long passage dealing with the existence of the self (edited in Frauwallner, 1968: p. 
50 l. 5 - p. 60 l. 23; translated pp. 51-61). This self is, as a matter of fact, stated to be different 
from the body, but the passage says nothing about its being “capable of enjoying the fruit of 
the Íåstra”. The first Påda of Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya, on the other hand, repeatedly 
deals with these issues. As a short example we can take the following statement from 
Ía∫kara's comments on BrahmasËtra 1.1.4:5 
 
“aßar¥raµ våva santaµ na priyåpriye sp®ßata˙” iti priyåpriyasparßanaprati∑edhåc 
codanålak∑aˆadharmakåryatvaµ mok∑åkhyasyåßar¥ratvasya prati∑idhyata iti gamyate 
From the denial of being affected by joy and sorrow expressed in the statement “Joy 
and sorrow do not affect the one without body” (Chåndogya Upani∑ad 8.12.1) we 
understand that the state of being without body, called liberation, is denied to be the 
effect of Dharma characterised as injunction. 
 
The “one without body” is the self. The present passage tells us that this self, which is without 
body, is capable of enjoying the fruit of the Íåstra, viz. liberation. 
 As an example of a short passage dealing with the existence of the self we can quote 
from Ía∫kara's comments on BrahmasËtra 1.1.1:6 
[125] 
                         
5 BSËBhå on sËtra 1.1.4 (ed. J.L. Shastri p. 72 l. 1-3). 
6 BSËBhå on sËtra 1.1.1 (ed. J.L. Shastri p. 43 l. 1-2). 
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sarvo hy åtmåstitvaµ pratyeti, na nåham asm¥ti/ yadi hi nåtmåstitvaprasiddhi˙ syåt 
sarvo loko nåham asm¥ti prat¥yåt/ 
For everyone is conscious of the existence of (his) self, and never thinks ‘I am not’. If 
the existence of the self were not known, every one would think ‘I am not’. (tr. 
Thibaut, 1890/1896: I: 14) 
 
There are therefore good reasons to interpret the passage from Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya 
on sËtra 3.3.53 cited above in the following manner: 
 
[Objection:] Has the existence of a self that is different from the body and capable of 
enjoying the fruits of the Íåstra not [already] been stated at the very beginning of the 
[present] Íåstra, in the first Påda [of the BrahmasËtra and its Bhå∑ya]? 
[Answer:] That is true; it has been stated by the author of the [BrahmasËtra-]Bhå∑ya 
(i.e., by Ía∫kara himself).7 But there (i.e., at the beginning of the BrahmasËtra) there is 
no sËtra about the existence of a self. Here (i.e., in BrahmasËtra 3.3.53), on the other 
hand, the existence of the [self] has been established, after an initial objection, by the 
author of the SËtra himself. And having taken it from here itself, Ócårya Íabarasvåmin 
has described [the existence of the self] in [the section of the M¥måµså Bhå∑ya] 
dealing with the means of valid cognition. Therefore also the revered Upavar∑a in the 
first Tantra (i.e. in his commentary on the M¥måµsåsËtra), when he had to discuss the 
existence of the self, contented himself with saying: ‘We shall explain this in the 
Íår¥raka’. 
 
This way of understanding Ía∫kara's reference to the first Påda agrees with the way in which 
he refers to the first, second and third Adhyåyas. Wherever in his BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya he 
refers to Adhyåyas, they are Adhyåyas of his BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya (or of the Brahma-
[126]sËtra), numbered according to the position they have in his own work. Ía∫kara refers to 
the “first Adhyåya” at the very beginning of the second Adhyåya of his BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya; 
here there can be no doubt that it concerns the first Adhyåya of the BrahmasËtra (Bhå∑ya), not 
of ritual M¥måµså. Similarly, the “second Adhyåya” referred to at the very beginning of the 
third Adhyåya and under BrahmasËtra 2.1.1 clearly refers to Ía∫kara's own second chapter (or 
to that chapter of the BrahmasËtra). The same applies to the “third Adhyåya” referred to at the 
beginning of chapter four and under BrahmasËtra 3.1.1.8 
 
A few words remain to be said about Íabara. The above passage shows that, in Ía∫kara's 
opinion, Íabara took a topic, or a passage, which belonged under BrahmasËtra 3.3.53 and 
                         
7 The use of the third person to refer to one's own work finds a parallel, e.g., in Maˆ∂ana 
Mißra's Brahmasiddhi (e.g. p. 75 l. 4: vak∑yati; p. 23 l. 17: åha), and is particularly common 
where an author has himself composed a commentary on his own work. Compare in this 
context Medhåtithi's remark under Manu 1.4 (I p. 7 l. 28-29): pråyeˆa granthakårå˙ svamataµ 
paråpadeßena bruvate: ‘atråha’ ‘atra pariharanti’ iti “it is a well known fact that in most cases 
the authors of Treatises state their own views as if emanating from other persons, making use 
of such expression as ‘in this connection he says’ or ‘they meet this argument thus’, and so 
forth” (tr. Jha, III p. 20, modified). Nowhere else in his BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya does Ía∫kara 
mention an ‘author of the Bhå∑ya’ (bhå∑yak®t; see Mahadevan, 1971&1973: II: 723). 
8 The fact that Bhåskara on sËtra 1.1.1 (ed. Dvivedin p. 6 l. 19-20) uses "in the first Påda" 
where Ía∫kara says "in the first Tantra" (ata evopavar∑åcåryeˆoktaµ prathamapåde 
åtmavådaµ tu ßår¥rake vak∑yåma iti) suggests that he already misinterpreted Ía∫kara. 
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placed it in his M¥måµså Bhå∑ya. The passage does not say what exactly he took, nor does it 
state that he took it from his own commentary on the BrahmasËtra. 
 Ía∫kara testimony loses most of its value in the light of Erich Frauwallner's (1968) 
analysis of Íabara's Bhå∑ya on M¥måµsåsËtra 1.1.1-5. It is this portion of Íabara's Bhå∑ya 
that contains a discussion of the self in a section dealing with the means of valid cognition, as 
noted by Ía∫kara. However, both the discussion of the self and the section on means of valid 
cognition in which it finds itself belong to the so-called V®ttikåra-grantha. That is to say, they 
belong to a portion which Íabara's explicitly cites from another author, whom he calls the 
V®ttikåra. No one, not even Ía∫kara, claims that the V®ttikåra-grantha as a whole was taken 
from a commentary on BrahmasËtra 3.3.53; the fact that the V®ttikåra-grantha comments 
several M¥måµsåsËtras excludes this as a possibility. Within the V®ttikåra-grantha the section 
on the existence of the self is an insertion (Frauwallner, 1968: 109-110). This implies that if 
someone has taken this section from a commentary on BrahmasËtra 3.3.53, it was not Íabara, 
but the V®ttikåra. It is therefore excluded that Ía∫kara still knew a commentary by Íabara on 
the BrahmasËtra which presumably contained the passage which is now part of the V®ttikåra-
grantha. Stated differently, it is open to question whether Ía∫kara knew more about Íabara 
than we do. 
[127] 
 This may not be all that surprising. Even Kumårila, who commented upon Íabara's 
Bhå∑ya itself and is commonly regarded as having lived before Ía∫kara (Pande, 1994: 46-47), 
did no longer know the extent of the V®ttikåra-grantha (Jacobi, 1911: 15 (573) f.).9 Ía∫kara's 
incorrect attribution of the discussion of the self to Íabara is therefore understandable. His 
claim to know where this passage came from, on the other hand, is no more reliable than this 
incorrect attribution. 
 Since Frauwallner's analysis may not be generally known, I cite here the most relevant 
passage (1968: 109-110): 
 
Der ganze V®ttikåragrantha˙ ist, im grossen gesehen, folgendermassen aufgebaut. 
Nach der Besprechung der Erkenntnismittel ergreift ein Gegner das Wort und bringt 
eine Reihe von Gründen gegen die Glaubwürdigkeit des Veda vor. Die späteren 
Kommentatoren nennen diesen Abschnitt Citråk∑epavåda˙, weil der Gegner von der 
vedischen Vorschrift “citrayå yajeta paßukåma˙” ausgeht. Die Antwort lautet zunächst 
im Anschluss an das SËtram 5, dass der Veda glaubwürdig ist wegen der 
Naturgegebenheit der Verknüpfung von Wort und Gegenstand. Das wird weit 
ausholend besprochen: Wesen des Wortes, Gegenstand des Wortes, Wesen der 
Verknüpfung und ihre Naturgegebenheit. Dann wird nochmal auf die Angriffe des 
Gegners im Citråk∑epa˙ zurückgegriffen und sie werden der Reihe nach widerlegt. 
Damit ist die ganze Auseinandersetzung abgeschlossen. 
 In die abschliessende Zurückweisung des Citråk∑epa˙ ist nun eine lange 
Erörterung über das Vorhandensein einer Seele eingefügt. Dass es sich dabei um einen 
sekundären Einschub handelt, zeigt schon das grobe Missverhältnis im Umfang dieses 
Einschubs gegenüber dem ganzen Abschnitt. Die ganze übrige Widerlegung des 
                         
9 Yoshimizu (2006) shows that Kumårila subsequently changed his mind about the extent of 
the V®ttikåra-grantha. 
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Citråk∑epa˙ umfasst nur 16 Zeilen, der Einschub 133 Zeilen. Ebenso krass ist die 
Äusserlichkeit der Einfügung. Auf diese lange Abschweifung folgt plötzlich ganz 
unvermittelt noch eine kurze Erwiderung auf einen der Einwände im Citråk∑epa˙, so 
dass der Leser zunächst erstaunt fragt, wovon denn eigentlich die Rede ist. 
[128] 
This analysis clearly shows that the portion on the soul is an insertion into the 
V®ttikåragrantha, and not into Íabara's commentary. Ía∫kara obviously had it wrong.10 
 There is less reason to be sceptical with regard to Ía∫kara's statement about Upavar∑a. 
There is no reason to doubt that Ía∫kara knew a commentary by Upavar∑a on the 
M¥måµsåsËtra in which its author stated: “We shall explain [the existence of the self] in the 
Íår¥raka”. What does this prove? 
 It seems plausible to conclude from this that Upavar∑a commented, or intended to 
comment, on both the M¥måµsåsËtra and the BrahmasËtra. Does this mean that he “seems to 
have treated the two sets of aphorisms as one connected work” (Nakamura, 1983: 398 n. 4, 
referring to Belvalkar)? This is far from certain. We know that another author, Maˆ∂ana 
Mißra, wrote treatises both on M¥måµså and on Vedånta around the time of Ía∫kara, and yet 
it cannot be maintained that he treated the two sets of aphorisms as one connected work. Not 
much later Våcaspati Mißra commented upon works belonging to a variety of schools of 
thought. The fact, therefore, that Upavar∑a commented (or wanted to comment) upon the 
classical texts of two schools of thought does not, in and by itself, prove that he looked upon 
these as fundamentally the same, or upon their classical texts as really being parts of one 
single text. Indeed, the very circumstance that he speaks in this connection of “the Íår¥raka” 
suggests that he did not look upon that work as simply a later part of the same commentary. 
And the fact that Ía∫kara speaks about Upavar∑a's ‘first Tantra’ without further specification 
while referring to his commentary on the M¥måµsåsËtra may simply suggest that Ía∫kara did 
not know Upavar∑a's commentary on the BrahmasËtra. 
 The analysis of Ía∫kara's statements does not, therefore, provide us with reliable 
evidence that would allow to conclude that until Ía∫kara, and more particularly at the time of 
Upavar∑a and Íabara, the M¥måµsåsËtra and the BrahmasËtra were looked upon as parts of 
one single work. Even less do these statements prove that the two systems of thought that find 
expression in those texts were believed to be in reality just one system of thought. Ía∫kara’s 
ßåstrårambha [129] was the beginning of the BrahmasËtra with commentary, and his Íåstra 
was the Vedåntam¥måµså, not some hypothetical M¥måµså that covered both PËrva- and 
Uttara-M¥måµså. 
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